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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d), whereby the defendant in a circuit court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order on
a misdemeanor offense.

In this case, the Honorable Michael K.

Burton, Judge, Third Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the State
of Utah had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Mr. Fox since
the officer who allegedly had reasonable suspicion was not
present at the Motion to Suppress hearing or the trial and was
therefore never called as a witness by the State of Utah.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's factual findings for a motion to suppress
should not be upset on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
Utah v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1990).

State of

Factual

findings are not clearly erroneous unless they "are against the
clear weight of evidence, or [unless] the appellate court
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made."

Id.

The trial court's legal conclusions

underlying the motion to suppress are reviewed under a correction

1

of error standard-

State of Utah v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215

(Utah App. 1991) .
RULES & STATUTES
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial
on the grounds that Officer Schow (SLCPD) lacked "reasonable
suspicion" to stop the defendant.

Defendant's motion to suppress

was argued and an evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 23,
1995 before Judge Cornaby in the Third Circuit Court, Murray
Department.

(The motion hearing will hereafter be referred to as

Motion.)
Testimony on the motion to suppress issue was heard from
defendant, George Cassity and Sherri Lee Blackburn.

Officer

McMorris, the Utah Highway Patrol officer, was present at the May
23, 1995 evidentiary hearing but did not testify since the
inquiry was limited to establishing that officer Schow, the Salt
Lake City officer, had "reasonable suspicion" to stop the
defendant.

Noticeably absent from the hearing was officer Schow.

As a result, no testimony was received from officer Schow as to
the reason he stopped defendant or as to any driving pattern that
2

may have been observed by officer Schow.

Defendant's motion to

suppress evidence was denied by Judge Cornaby.
Defendant was later convicted of a DUI after a bench trial
before Judge Burton on September 12, 1995 in the Third Circuit
Court, Murray Department.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On January 7, 1995, George Cassity followed defendant

from a restaurant downtown to approximately 3900 South and Main
Street when Mr, Cassity saw two Salt Lake City Police vehicles
parked near the intersection.
2.

Motion, 21-22.

Mr. Cassity stopped and gave the Salt Lake City

officers certain information regarding Mr. Fox's driving pattern
and when asked for his name and address he gave the officers a
false name and address. Motion, 23.
3.

Sherri Lee Blackburn was a passenger in defendant's

vehicle and testified as to the events leading up to the stop and
that defendant's driving patterns were not unusual. Motion, 4243.
4.

On January 7, 1995 at approximately 12:00 a.m.,

defendant was travelling westbound on 4500 South at approximately
350 West in Salt Lake County.

Motion, 53-54, 59. Defendant was

in his vehicle at a traffic light waiting to turn left when
Officer Schow, a Salt Lake City Police officer, pulled up behind
defendant.

Over his loud speaker Officer Schow directed

3

defendant to pull through the red light and off to the side of
the road.
5.

Motion, 53-54.
Defendant was subsequently given field sobriety tests

and an intoxilyzer test by Utah Highway Patrol Officer McMorris
who arrived at the scene at approximately 1:30 a.m.
36.

Motion, 34-

According to Officer McMorris, defendant failed the field

sobriety tests.

Defendant was then given an intoxilyzer test in

which he was required to blow into the intoxilyzer mouthpiece
multiple times.

After blowing into the mouthpiece a third time

defendant registered a .08 blood alcohol level.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Salt Lake City Police Officer who pulled the defendant
over failed to articulate his reasonable suspicion that the
defendant had committed or was committing a crime or that the
defendant was stopped incident to a traffic offense.

In fact,

the officer was not even present at the motion to suppress
hearing or the trial.

Therefore, defendant's conviction must be

reversed and this case remanded to the trial court with
directions to grant defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
ARGUMENT
BEFORE A POLICE OFFICER MAY STOP AND DETAIN A CITIZEN,
HE MUST FIRST HAVE REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT
THE CITIZEN HAS COMMITTED OR IS IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING
A CRIME.
The starting point in examining police conduct in the search
and seizure area lies in state statutes.
4

See Generally, State v.

Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Oregon App. 1986).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15

established basic search and seizure ground rules:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
The level of suspicion contemplated in § 77-7-15 "must be
based on objective facts suggesting that the individual may be
involved in criminal activity."

State of Utah v. Menke, 787 P.2d

537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).1
Section 77-7-15 is most often interpreted in conjunction
with federal and state constitutional analysis. Menke, 787 p.2d
at 540-41 (discussing Fourth Amendment in conjunction with § 777-15).

Utah appellate courts have determined that § 77-7-15

codifies the Fourth Amendment "reasonable suspicion" requirement
first spelled out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541.

See

It requires a police officer, before

making such a level II stop "to point to specific and articulable
1

In State of Utah v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (1987), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized three levels of police-citizen
encounters: (1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic]
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against
his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; and (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed.
A traffic stop is a level II encounter.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988).
5

State of Utah v.

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."

Menke, 787 P.2d at

541 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21). An arresting
officer must be able to articulate why particular facts lead to
an inference of criminal activity.

If the officer fails to

articulate specific facts, his suspicion is classified as a mere
hunch which is not a legitimate basis for such a level II stop.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
In the instant cast, the officer who made the level II stop
did not appear or testify at defendant's motion to suppress
hearing.

Therefore, it was impossible for the State to meet its

burden of demonstrating "reasonable suspicion" for stopping
defendant.
It is well established that a police officer's stop of an
automobile is a "seizure" and therefore subject to Fourth
Amendment Protections.
(Utah App. 1992).

State of Utah v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257

Consequently, a stop can be justified only

upon a showing of "reasonable suspicion" that an individual had
committed or was committing a crime or was stopped incident to a
traffic offense.

Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012

(Utah App. 1989).
In Roth, the Court of Appeals of Utah cited several cases
involving reasonable suspicion.

One such case was State v.

Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Oregon App. 1986).

In Black, the court

ruled that an anonymous tip could not be the basis for a stop
6

where there was no indicia of reliability and the officer's
observation did not corroborate the tip.
The facts in Black are similar to the facts in the instant
case.

In Black/ a woman telephoned the police department and

stated that a brown Ford Escort was speeding and weaving and
identified its approximate location.

This information was

immediately radioed to a state trooper in the area. Within
minutes the trooper observed a car matching the description, but
did not observe any erratic driving.

The trooper stopped the car

and subsequently arrested the driver for DUI.
In applying a Fourth Amendment "reasonable suspicion"
analysis, the court in Black set forth the following indicia of
reliability of an informant's tip:
(1) the informant was known to the officer and had supplied
information to him in the past;
(2) the informant came forth personally and gave
information that was immediately verifiable at the
scent; and
(3) the informant subjected himself to the possibility of
an arrest for making a false report if the officer's
investigation was fruitless.
The court recognized that there must be some indicia of
reliability of an informant's tip in order to justify police in
acting on it by making a stop.

In applying this analysis to the

facts of that case, the court found that the informant's tip
therein had no indicia of reliability.

The caller gave

insufficient information to identify herself and the trooper's
personal observations did not corroborate the tip.
7

The court

stated that the fact that the informant had accurately described
the defendant's car was not a sufficient indication of
reliability.

Black, 721 P.2d at 846.

In the instant case, defendant was stopped in unincorporated
Salt Lake County by a Salt Lake City officer approximately three
miles outside Salt Lake City limits.

No evidence was presented

to the trial court as to the basis for the stop since Officer
Schow, the Salt Lake Police officer, did not appear at the
evidentiary hearing.

The trial court relied on testimony from an

informant who admittedly disliked the defendant and who gave the
Salt Lake City officers false information regarding his name and
address.

Following the analysis in Black, the trial court should

have determined that the informant's tip lacked indicia of
reliability and that no officer personally observed any driving
pattern that would indicate possible intoxication.
CONCLUSION
A police officer making a level II stop must articulate his
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was
committing a crime or that the defendant was stopped incident to
a traffic offense.

In this case, the officer did not articulate

such reasonable suspicion, in fact the officer did not articulate
any facts since he was not present at the evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

Consequently,

defendant's conviction must be reversed and this case remanded to

8

the trial court with directions to grant defendant's motion to
suppress evidence,
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